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ABSTRACT 
We introduce a solution for matrix games with fuzzy payoffs via the 
α -cuts and the introduction of Nature as a third player expressing the 
uncertainty involved in the game. The beliefs of players about the 
behavior of Nature are based on the Laplace’s principle of “insufficient 
reason”. Moreover, we provide a procedure for computing the introduced 
solution. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Several approaches for solving matrix games with fuzzy payoffs have 
been proposed in literature (Bector et al., 2004a; Bector et al., 2004b; Bector 
& Chandra, 2005; Campos,1989; Li,1999, Li & Yang, 2004; Maeda, 2003; 
Nishizaki & Sakawa, 1995, 1997, 2001; Vijay et al, 2005a, 2005b, Vijay et al., 
2007). These approaches can be classified into three classes. In the first class 
(Bector et al, 2004a; Bector et al., 2004b; Bector & Chandra, 2005; Campos, 
1989; Li, 1999; Maeda; 2003; Vijay et al., 2005a, 2005b), following the theory 
of crisp matrix games, the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium Nash (1951), 
is transformed into a problem of resolution of a pair of independent fuzzy 
linear (single objective or multiobjective) programming problems. Then some 
defuzzification technique is used to transform the obtained pair of fuzzy linear 
programming problems into a pair of crisp linear programming problems. In 
Bector et al (2004b) the defuzzification of the pair of fuzzy linear 
programming problems is based on ranking of fuzzy numbers by Yager’s 
different ranking functions (indexes) Yager (1981). In Bector et al. (2004a) a 
pair of dual fuzzy linear programming problems in the fuzzy sense is obtained, 
then the Yager’s first index is used for defuzzification. In Li (1999) an 
ordering of triangular fuzzy numbers is used to define a solution to the fuzzy 
matrix game. Then based on the same ordering, a pair of two multiobjective 
crisp linear programming problems is obtained for finding the introduced 
solution. In Maeda (2003) a more general ordering of fuzzy numbers based on 
α -cuts is used. The introduced concept of solution is obtained as Nash 
equilibrium of a constructed crisp bimatrix game. It has to be noted that the 
approach in Maeda (2003) is limited to symmetric triangular fuzzy numbers 
only. Most of the approaches of the first class are discussed in details in Bector 
and Chandra (2005). In the second class Nishizaki & Sakawa (1995, 1997, 
2001), the membership function of the expected fuzzy score yAxT ~ of the 
maximizing player is used to define solutions. In Nishizaki & Sakawa (1995) 
the expected fuzzy score and a fuzzy goal are used to define a crisp payoff for 
the maximizing player as a degree of attainment of his fuzzy goal. The 
considered solution is based on the maxmin principle. Recently, Vijay et al. 
(2007) introduced a third class of approaches based on fuzzy relations. The 
fuzzy relation approach unifies the existing theories on fuzzy matrix games. In 
this approach the fuzzy matrix game is transformed into a pair of fuzzy 
optimization problems where constraints are expressed by fuzzy relations. 
Further, this pair is formulated as a pair of semi-infinite programming 
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problems. Matrix games with fuzzy goals and matrix games with possibility 
and necessity relations have been studied as special cases. Finally, note that 
most of the approaches developed for matrix games with fuzzy payoffs have 
been extended to bimatrix games with fuzzy payoffs and fuzzy goals, and 
multiple objective matrix and bimatrix games with fuzzy payoffs and fuzzy 
goals (Bector & Chandra, 2005; Nishizaki & Sakawa, 2001; and Vijay et al., 
2005a, 2005b). For an extensive survey on fuzzy bimatrix games and fuzzy 
games in normal form and their applications see Larbani (2009a). 
In Chen and Larbani (2005) we proposed a game approach for solving a 
multi-attribute decision making (MADM) problem with fuzzy decision matrix 
by using α -cuts and introducing Nature as a player (against the decision 
maker) representing the fuzzyness. In Larbani (2009b) we have extended this 
approach to bimatrix games with fuzzy payoffs by using α -cuts and 
introducing Nature as a third player representing the uncertainty involved in 
such games. The proposed solution of the bimatrix game is based on the 
maxmin principle of decision making under uncertainty Luce and Raiffa 
(1957). 
In this paper we adopt the same approach for solving matrix games with 
fuzzy payoffs, however, the solution we propose here is based on the 
Laplace’s principle of “insufficient reason” for decision making under 
uncertainty Luce and Raiffa (1957). We first use α -cuts to defuzzify the 
payoff matrix, then we construct a crisp three person game where Nature is 
introduced as a third player without payoff function that chooses its strategies 
from the α -cuts of the entries of the payoff matrix. Then using the principle 
of “insufficient reason” of Laplace for decision making under uncertainty Luce 
& Raiffa (1957), we introduce a solution concept to the defuzzified fuzzy 
matrix game. The computation of our solution is also studied. A discussion of 
the existing solutions of fuzzy bimatrix games is provided. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the 
proposed solution. Section 3 deals with the computation of the introduced 
solution and discussion of related work. Section 4 concludes the paper.  
2. THE SOLUTION 
In this section we present a solution concept for a matrix games with 
fuzzy payoffs based on defuzzification of the fuzzy payoff matrix via α -cuts 
and the introduction of a third player without payoff function, Nature. Here 
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Nature represents the uncertainty involved in the game i.e. fuziness. We 
assume that the players adopt the Laplace’s principle of “insufficient reason” 
for decision making under uncertainty Luce & Raiffa (1957) with respect to 
the behavior of Nature towards them. 
Let us consider the following matrix game with fuzzy payoffs 
 1G = )
~
 , ,( n ASS m   (1) 
where mS = { ),...,,( 21 mxxxx = , 0≥ix , mi ,1= , ∑
=
m
i
ix
1
=1},  
nS ={ ),...,,( 21 nyyyy = , 0≥iy , ni ,1= , ∑
=
n
j
iy
1
=1} are the sets of 
mixed strategies of Player I and II respectively, A~  = 
nj
miija
≤≤
≤≤
1
1)~(  is the fuzzy 
payoff matrix, ija
~ is a fuzzy interval with bounded support as defined by 
Dubois & Prade (2000). A fuzzy interval F~  with bounded support is defined 
by (.)),(~ μRF =  with (.)~Fμ ]1,0[: →R verifying the following conditions 
 
(i) )(~ xFμ =0 for all ],] cx ∞−∈ , 
(ii) (.)~Fμ  is right-continuous non-decreasing on [c,a], 
(iii) )(~ xFμ =1 for all ],[ bax ∈ , 
(iv) (.)~Fμ  is left-continuous non-increasing on [b,d], 
(v) )(~ xFμ =0 for all [,[ +∞∈ dx , 
 
where +∞<≤≤≤<∞− dbac , and R is the real line. 
 
Assumption 2.1. In non cooperative games, the following assumptions are 
generally made. 
 
(i) Players are rational. 
(ii) There are no enforceable agreements between players. 
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(iii) The game is of complete information, that is, all the data of the game 
(1) are common knowledge among players Fudenberg & Tirole 
(1993). 
 
Regarding the fuzzy payoffs, it is assumed that the only information 
available to players about the fuzzy payoff ija
~
 is its membership function
)(~ x
ija
μ , mi ,1= , nj ,1= .  
We start by taking the α -cut 
njmiijaA ≤≤≤≤= 1,1)]~([
~ αα of the payoff matrix 
A~ of the game (1), where α]~[ ija = { ija / αμ ≥)(~ ija aij }, mi ,1= , nj ,1= . 
Since ija
~ is a fuzzy interval with bounded support, its α -cut is a closed 
bounded interval, that is 
 
α]~[ ija  = { ija / ijija aij αμ ≥)(~ }=[ αα UijLij aa , ], mi ,1= , nj ,1= .  
We can also write  
 
α]~[ ija =[ αα UijLij aa , ]= { }]1,0[ /)1( ∈−+ ijLijijUijij a βββ αα , mi ,1= , nj ,1= .  (2) 
Thus, choosing a number ija in the α -cut 
α]~[ ija is equivalent to 
choosing a number ijβ  in [0, 1], mi ,1= , nj ,1=  . The α -cut α]~[ ija is the 
set of payoffs ija that have at least an α degree of membership to ija
~
. 
In this paper we assume that once the cut-level α  has been chosen, the 
players are certain that their payoff value ija will vary in 
α]~[ ija , mi ,1= , 
nj ,1= . However, we assume that they do not know which particular values 
ija
α]~[ ija∈  (or equivalently ijβ in [0, 1]), mi ,1= , nj ,1=  will actually 
occur. In terms of necessity measure Dubois and Prade (2000), we assume that 
once α  is chosen, the players assign a necessity degree 1 to the event that the 
payoff value ija is in 
α]~[ ija , mi ,1= , nj ,1= . Hence, the players would 
consider that ija  is an unknown parameter that varies in 
α]~[ ija , mi ,1= , 
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nj ,1= . Thus, in addition to the strategic uncertainty, the players face 
another type of uncertainty represented by the possible realizations of the 
unknown parameters (payoffs) ija  in α]~[ ija , mi ,1= , nj ,1= . Hence, they 
have to adopt a decision making under uncertainty principle Luce & Raiffa 
(1957). Then the problem can be considered as a game against Nature Milnor 
(1957). Thus, Nature enters the game as a third player that chooses the crisp 
payoffs ija  in 
α]~[ ija , mi ,1= , nj ,1= . However, Nature is a special 
player: it has no payoff function. Here it has to be noted that since the interests 
of players are totally opposed (zero-sum game), Nature cannot be against both 
of them at the same time: if Nature is against any player, this means that it 
favors the other player. Thus, we have two possible approaches. The first one 
is to assume that Nature is neutral or has a balanced behavior towards players. 
The second one is that Nature is against one of the players, in which case it 
favors the other player. To illustrate this fact let us consider any strategy ijβ  
of Nature as defined in (2). Then if ijβ is greater than 1/2, this means that 
Nature favors larger values of ija , that is, it favors Player I and goes against 
Player II, with respect to strategies i and j. Conversely, if it chooses ijβ  less 
than 1/2, then it favors Player II and goes against player I. Finally, if Nature 
chooses ijβ = ½, then it shows a balanced behavior towards players with 
respect to strategies i and j. Globally, the behavior of Nature towards players 
can be described as follows. According to (2), choosing ija  in α]~[ ija , 
mi ,1= , nj ,1=  is equivalent to choosing ijβ in [0, 1], mi ,1= , nj ,1= . 
The set of all possible choices (or behaviors) of Nature is  
 { } ,1  ,,1  ],1,0[ /)( njmiT ijij ==∈== βββ .  
First, notice that if Nature chooses a strategy )( ijββ = in T  such that 
1=ijβ , for all mi ,1= , nj ,1= , i.e. mn
ji
ij =∑
,
β (here and in the sequel we 
denote by ∑
ji  ,
the double summation symbol∑∑
= =
m
i
n
j1 1
), this means that it 
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favors the Player I completely. On the other hand, if Nature chooses a strategy 
)( ijββ = in T  such that 0=ijβ , for all mi ,1= , nj ,1= , i.e. 0
  ,
=∑
ji
ijβ , 
this means that Nature favors Player II completely. For any strategy 
)( ijββ = in T  of Nature, we have mn
ji
ij ≤≤∑
 ,
0 β , where the values 0 and 
mn represent the extreme behaviors. Any other type of behavior of Nature can 
be represented by a value ]1,0[∈p , such that p is the degree to which Nature 
favors Player I and 1-p is the degree to which Nature favors Player II. Indeed, 
for a given ]1,0[∈p , the set of strategies of Nature that corresponds to this 
behavior is  
 
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
=∈== ∑   and  /)(
 ,
ij
ji
ijp pmnTT ββββ  (3)  
Thus, we obtain the following three-person extended crisp game 
 2G = ),( βA, T, SS pnm   (4) 
In this game there are three players: Player I, Player II and Nature. Nature 
has no payoff, its set of strategies is pT ; the payoff functions and sets of 
strategies of Player I and Player II are yAxT β , 
mS  and yAxT β− , 
nS  
respectively; njmi
L
ij
L
ij
U
ijij aaaA ≤≤≤≤+−= 1 ,1))(( αααβ β is the crisp payoff 
matrix of the game. 
The idea of introducing variables that take values in α -cuts to defuzzify a 
decision making problem was first introduced by Sakawa & Yano (1989) for a 
multiobjective problem with fuzzy parameters, but they assumed that the 
introduced variables that vary in the α -cuts are decision variables. That is, 
they are controlled by the decision makers. Our approach differs in the sense 
that we assume that the decision makers control the level α of the α -cuts, but 
they do not control the variables ija that take their values in the α -cuts 
α]~[ ija
, mi ,1= , nj ,1= . In Chen and Larbani (2005) we have first used this 
approach to solve a multi-attribute decision making (MADM) problem with 
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fuzzy decision matrix by introducing Nature as a second player. We made the 
assumption that the entries of the decision matrix are interdependent triangular 
fuzzy numbers via a parameter λ . In Larbani (2009b) we have extended this 
approach to bimatrix games with fuzzy payoffs by using α -cuts and 
introducing Nature as a third player representing the fuzziness involved in 
such game. The proposed solution of the bimatrix game is based on the 
maxmin principle of decision making under uncertainty Luce and Raiffa 
(1957). In this paper we adopt the same approach for solving fuzzy matrix 
games with fuzzy payoffs, however, the solution we propose here is based on 
the Laplace’s principle of “insufficient reason” for decision making under 
uncertainty Luce and Raiffa (1957). 
 
Definition 2.1. Assume that ]1,0[∈p  and the cut level α  are given. A 
pair of real numbers ( wv, ) is called α p- acceptable solution to the game (4) 
if there exists a pair of mixed strategies nm SSyx ×∈∗∗ ),( such that  
 
(i) vyAx T ≥∗ β , nSy ∈∀  and pT∈∀β ,  
(ii) wyAxT ≤∗β , mSx ∈∀  and pT∈∀β . 
 
If ( wv, ) is an α p-acceptable solution to the game (4) then v  
(respectively w  ) is called an α p-acceptable value for Player I (respectively 
for Player II). 
Let us introduce the following sets for Player I and Player II respectively  
 
pW α1
 
{ }pntm TSyvyAxSxRv ×∈∀≥′∈′∃∈= ),(  ,  ,   / ββ  and  
 
pW α2
 
{ }pmtn TSxwyAxSyRw ×∈∀≤′∈′∃∈= ),(  , ,  / ββ . 
The relation between theα p-acceptable solution and the sets pW α1  and 
pW α2 is given by the following proposition the proof of which is 
straightforward. 
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Proposition 2.1. Assume that ]1,0[∈p  and the cut level α  are given. A 
pair of real numbers ),( ∗∗ wv  is anα p-acceptable solution for the game (4) if 
and only if ∈∗∗ ),( wv pW α1  pW α2× . 
 
Proposition 2.2. pMaxW α1  and 
pMinW α2  exist. 
Proof. The function yAxyxf t ββ =),,(  is continuous in the compact 
p
nm TSS ××
 , then the value εββ =yAx
t
yx ),(
minmax exists. Therefore, there 
exists mSx ∈′  such that  , ( , )t pnx A y y S Tβ ε β′ ≥ ∀ ∈ × , hence pW αε 1∈ , 
that is, pW α1 is not empty. The non emptiness of 
pW α2 can be proved similarly. 
For a pair ),( βy , we consider the function 
 
IRSf my →:β   
 
vyAxxfx ty −=→ ββ )(,   
We have ∈∗v pW α1 ,0)( , , ≥′∈′∃⇔ xfSx ym β  ( , ) n py S Tβ ∈∀ × . 
Then pW α1 = [ [I
TSy
y
n
f
×∈
− +∞
),(
1
,
),0(
β
β . The function )(, xfx yβ→  is 
continuous, ( , ) n py S Tβ ∈∀ ×  and [ [+∞,0 is a closed set, then 
[ [),0(1
,
+∞−yfβ , ( , ) n py S Tβ ∈∀ × . Therefore pW α1 = [ [I
TSy
y
n
f
×∈
− +∞
),(
1
,
),0(
β
β  is 
a closed set. Let pWv α1∈ then there exists 
mSx ∈′ such that 
( , ) n py S Tβ ∈∀ × ,vyAx t ≥′ β , which implies vyAx ty ≥′ ββ ),(min . Moreover, 
we have vyAxyAx t
y
t
yx
≥′≥= ββββε ),(),( minminmax . Since v is arbitrarily 
chosen in pW α1 , we conclude that 
pW α1 is bounded from above byε . 
Therefore, pMaxW α1 exists. One can similarly show that 
pMinW α2 exists.  
Thus, we propose the following solution for the game (1). 
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Definition 2.2. Let 1pW α  and 2pW α  be the sets of α p-acceptable values 
for Player I and player II, respectively. Let ( ∗∗ wv , ) 21 pp WW αα ×∈  such that 
1 
pWMaxv α=∗  and 2 pWMinw α=∗  and let nm SSyx ×∈∗∗ ),(  be the 
corresponding pair of mixed strategies. Then ),,,( ∗∗∗∗ wvyx  is calledα p-
Nash solution of the game (1), where ∗v  (respectively ∗w ) is the value of the 
game for player I (respectively Player II) and ∗x  (respectively ∗y ) is called an 
optimal strategy for Player I (respectively Player II). 
The solution defined through Definitions 2.1-2.2 is similar to that of 
Bector et al. (2004a). However, our solution depends on the strategy of Nature 
β . Moreover, the inequalities (i)-(ii) in Definition 2.1 are nonlinear and crisp, 
which is not the case in Bector et al. (2004a). 
According to the settings of the game, there is no reason to think that 
Nature will favor any of the players globally. Hence we can fairly assume that 
the players adopt the Laplace’s insufficient reason principle of decision 
making under uncertainty Luce & Raiffa (1957) with respect to the behavior of 
Nature towards them. That is, the players assume that, globally, Nature has a 
balanced behavior towards them, but each of them does not know in which 
payoffs (entries ija ) Nature favors him and in which payoff it does not. In 
order to maintain the complete information spirit of the game (1) (Assumption 
2.1 (iii)), we assume that this assumption is a common knowledge among 
players as well. Let us represent formally this assumption on the behavior of 
Nature. In terms of strategies, this assumption means that Nature chooses 
strategies )( ijββ =  in T  that yield a global value ∑
ji
ij
 ,
β  in the middle of 
the interval [0, mn] i.e. 
 
22
0
 ,
mnmn
ji
ij =
+
=∑β   
In other words, the players assume p = 1/2 in (3), i.e. Nature chooses its 
strategies β  in 
 
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
=∈== ∑  )2/1( and  /)(
 ,
ij2/1
ji
ij mnTT ββββ   (5) 
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This means that, globally, Nature does not favor any of the players. The 
ideal case is when Nature chooses 2/1=ijβ , mi ,1= , nj ,1= , then it 
doesn’t favor any of the two player globally or locally. 
 
Definition 2.3. In the particular case where p = 1/2, an α 1/2-Nash 
solution of the game (1) is called α -Nash-Laplace solution (α -NL solution) 
of the game (1). 
3. COMPUTATION OF THE SOLUTION 
We will present a general method for computation of α -NL solution of 
the game (1). 
Using Definitions 2.1-2.3, we can find an α -NL solution of the game (1) 
by solving the following pair of crisp nonlinear programming problems 
Max v  
Subject to,  
 
vyAxT ≥β
, 
nSy ∈  and pT∈β   (6) 
 
mSx ∈
  
and 
 Min w   
Subject to, 
 
wyAxT ≤β
, 
mSx ∈  and pT∈β   (7) 
nSy ∈
. 
Since mS and nS are polytopes, we can use their extreme points only 
Vijay et al. (2005b), then the problems (6)-(7) can be transformed into a pair 
of crisp nonlinear programming problems 
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Max v  
Subject to, 
 
vAx j
T ≥)( β
, nj ,1= , pT∈β ,  (8) 
mSx ∈
 
 
and  
Min w  
Subject to, 
 
wyA i ≤)( β
, mi ,1= , pT∈β   (9) 
nSy ∈
, 
where iA )( β  (respectively jA )( β ) denotes the i-th row (respectively j-th 
column) of the matrix βA . Here also we note that the problems (8)-(9) are 
similar to the problems obtained in (Bector et al., 2004a; Campos, 1989). 
However, the problems (8)-(9) involve the additional variable β , which is not 
the case in (Bector et al., 2004a; Bector et al., 2004b).  
 
Remark 3.1. Since the sets pT , 
mS and nS are compact and the function 
( β,, yx ) → yAxT β  is continuous, then each of the problems (8)-(9) has a 
solution. Hence the problems (6)-(7) have a solution as well. 
Remark 3.2. 
 
(i) In the case the entries ija~ of the fuzzy payoff matrix A
~
 of the game 
(1) are symmetric triangular fuzzy numbers (STFNs), i.e. ija~ = 
( ha Mij , ij), where Mija is the main value and hij the width, we have
)  ( αα LijUij aa −  = ( )α2  2 −ijh , hence 
njmi
L
ij
L
ij
U
ijij aaaA ≤≤≤≤+−= 1 ,1))(( αααβ β =
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njmi
L
ijijij ah ≤≤≤≤+− 1 ,1))22( ( ααβ , then the matrix βA takes the 
form αβ βα Lh AA   )2  2(  +−= , where njmiLijL aA ≤≤≤≤= 1,1)( αα
and  hβ = njmiijijh ≤≤≤≤ 1,1)( β . 
(ii) In the case the entries ija~ of the fuzzy payoff matrix A
~
 of the game 
(1) are triangular fuzzy numbers (TFNs) Bector & Chandra (2005), 
i.e. ija
~
=( UijMijLij aaa ,, ), we have  
 
α]~[ ija
=[(
αL
ij
M
ij aa − )α +
αL
ija
, -(
M
ij
U
ij aa −
α
)α +
αU
ija ].  
Procedure 3.1. Computation of α p-Nash solution. 
 
Step 1. Assume that p is fixed. Ask the players to provide theirα -cut 
levels. Assume that they have chosen 1α and 2α , respectively. Then take α
=Max{ 1α , 2α } in order to satisfy each player’s choice. Further, compute the 
α -cuts  
 
α]~[ ija
 = { ija / αμ ≥)(~ ija aij }=[
αα U
ij
L
ij aa , ], mi ,1= , nj ,1=
 
 
In case the players are not able to provide their own α -cut levels, they 
may be determined by consulting with experts.  
 
Step 2. Construct and solve the pair of nonlinear programming problems 
(8)-(9). The obtained solution ),,,( ∗∗∗∗ wvyx is an α -NL solution to the 
considered game with cut-level α . 
Let us now illustrate this procedure by an example. We consider the 
following example that appears in (Bector et al., 2004a; Bector & 
Chandra,2005 (see page 148); Campos, 1989; Li & Yang, 2004; Vijay et al., 
2007), in order to compare our results with those of existing approaches. 
 
Example 3.1. (Computation of α -NL solution) Consider the fuzzy game 
defined by the fuzzy payoff matrix  
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⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
=
08~10~9
65~108~1~A
  (10) 
The entries of A~  are the following TFNs: )190,180,175(08~1 = , 
)158,156,150(65~1 = and )100,90,80(0~9 = . Let us compute an α -NL solution of 
this game by Procedure 3.1, assuming p = 1/2. 
Step1. Ask the players to provide their α -cut levels. Assume that they 
have chosen 1α and 2α  respectively. Let α =Max{ 1α , 2α } in order to satisfy 
both players.  
First we solve the problem for arbitrary levels 1α , 2α , then we assume 
concrete values for these parameters. We have  
 
α]~[ ija
 = { ija / αμ   )(~ ≥ija aij } = [
αα U
ij
L
ij aa , ], 2,1  =i , 2,1  =j
 
 
 
[ ] [ ]190)180190(  ,175)175180(08~1 +−−+−= ααα
  
[ ]19010  ,1755  +−+= αα
 ,   
 
[ ] [ ]ααα  2 158 ,6  150  156 −+=
, and [ ] [ ]ααα  10 100 , 10 80  90 −+= .  
We have 2/122 ××=mnp =2, then 
   2   and   / )(    
,
ij2/1 ⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
=∈== ∑
ji
ij TT ββββ .  
Compute the matrix 
njmi
L
ij
L
ij
U
ijij aaaA ≤≤≤≤+−= 1 ,1)  )  ( (  αααβ β , 2/1T∈β
. Since the payoffs are TFN, according to Remark 3.2 
 
njmi
L
ij
L
ij
U
ijij aaaA ≤≤≤≤+−= 1 ,1)   )  ( (  αααβ β
 =  
  
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
++−++−
++−++−
) 5 175(  )15  15()10  80(  )20  20(
) 6 150(  )8  8()5  175(  )15 15(
2221
1211
αβααβα
αβααβα
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Step 2. The pair of problems (8)-(9) takes the form 
vMax 
 
 
vxx   )) 10 80(  )20  20((  )) 5 175(  )15 15(( 212111 ≥++−+++− αβααβα
  
 
vxx   )) 5 175(  )15  15((   )) 6 150(  )8 8(( 222121 ≥++−+++− αβααβα
  
 
2,1 ,0   ,121 =≥=+ ixxx i
, 
2/1T∈β
.  
and  
wMin  
 
 
wyy   )) 6 150(  )8  8((  )) 5 175(  )15  15(( 212111 ≤++−+++− αβααβα
  
wyy   )) 5 175(  )15  15((  )) 10 80(  )20  20(( 222121 ≤++−+++− αβααβα     
 
2,1 ,0   ,121 =≥=+ jyyy j
, 2/1T∈β .  
Using the constraints 121 =+ xx  and 121 =+ yy , we simplify the last 
pair of problems as follow 
 
vxxx
vxxx
vMax
≥+++−+−+−++−
≥+++−+−+−+−
αβαβαβαα
αβαβαβαα
5175)1515()88()1515()25(
 1080)2020()1515()2020()595(
 
221121221
211111211
  
 
  ,1 0 1 ≤≤ x , 2/1T∈β .  
and 
 
wyyy
wyyy
wMin
≤+++−+−+−++−
≤+++−+−+−+−
αβαβαβαα
αβαβαβαα
5175)1515()1515()1515()595(
6150)88()1515()88()25(
 
221211221
121111121
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  ,1 0 1 ≤≤ y , 2/1T∈β .  
Solving the last pair of problems by Nimbus software Miettinen & Mäkelä 
(2006), we obtain the following solutions for different values of α  
Note that in Tables 1 and 2 for all values of 1≠α , we have ∑ ijβ =2. For 
α = 1, we do not provide the ijβ  values, because the game (4) corresponding 
to (10) reduces to a crisp matrix game (see item (iii) of Remark 3.3 below). 
Assume, for instance, that the players have actually chosen the α -cut 
levels as 1α =1/2, 2α =2/3, respectively. Then α =Max {1/2, 2/3}=2/3. The 
corresponding α -NL solution to the considered game with cut-level 2/3 is 
)2257.0,7743.0()3/2( =x ,  
 
)7432.0,2568.0()3/2( =y
,
52.161)3/2( =v
   
and 
 
32.160)3/2( =w , (see Tables 1 and 2).   
Example 3.2. Assume that in Example 3.1 njmiij ,1,,1,2/1 ===β , 
i.e. Nature chooses the ideal neutral behaviour towards players, then the pair 
of problems (8) and (9) will reduce to the following pair of problems 
vMax 
  
 
( )
( ) ( ) vx
vx
≥−++−
≥+−
αα
α
5365)2/1(957)2/1(
905185)2/1(
1
1
  (11) 
 
  ,1 0 1 ≤≤ x
 
and 
wMin 
  
 
wy
wy
≤−+−
≤−+−
α
αα
1019090
2158)832(
1
1
  (12) 
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 .1 0 1 ≤≤ y
   
The solution of this pair of problems is  
 
)
14-242
9-57
 ,
14-242
5-185
 ()(
α
α
α
α
α =x
,  
 
α
αα
α
28484
77785437025)(
2
−
−−
=v
  (13) 
 
)
4-242
5-185
 ,
4-242
9-57
 ()(
α
α
α
α
α =y
,   
and 
 
α
αα
α
28484
77785437025)(
2
−
−−
=w
. (14) 
We obtain the following particular solutions, by taking different values of 
α  
 
Remark 3.3. It is interesting to note the following. 
 
(i) the obtained solution ))(),(),(),(( αααα wvyx is expressed as an 
explicit function of the cut-level α . Hence if the players change the 
confidence level α , there is no need for solving the pair of problems 
(11)-(12) again. This shows some flexibility in our approach and 
sensitivity analysis with respect to α can be done. 
(ii) )()( αα wv = , for all ]1,0]∈α . This means that what Player I gains 
is exactly what Player II looses. In other words, the zero-sum game 
character of the game is maintained. The solution obtained for the 
game (10) by Bector et al. (2004a) is  
 for Player I, ( ) 2750.7725,0.2 * =x  and V=160.91;  
 for Player II ( )   7250.2275,0.7 * =y  and W= 160.65. 
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 As we see WV ≠ , the players receive different values. This 
difference, may be, is due to the fact that the authors have taken 
different adequacy margins )011.0 ,01.0 ,08.0(~~ 21 == pp  and 
)17.0 ,15.0 ,14.0(~~ 21 == qq  at the defuzzifaction step (see pages 148-
149 in Bector & Chandra (2005) ). 
 We notice also that these results are close to ours when the confidence 
level is 1=α :  
 
)1(x ( ) 4/19 , 15/19  = =(0.7894, 0.2105), ( ) 19/15, 4/19 )1( =y = 
(0.2105, 0.7894) and )1()1( wv = =161.05. In Bector et al. (2004a) 
the approach depends on the first Yager’s index Yager (1981) given 
by F( d~ ) = ∫
∫
U
L
U
L
d
d
d
d
dxx
dxxx
 )(
 )(
μ
μ
 (the centroid of d~ ), where d~ is a fuzzy 
number and (.)μ is its membership function. The index function F(.) 
is used along with adequacies 1
~p and 2
~q for ranking the fuzzy 
numbers involved in the constraints of the obtained pair of dual fuzzy 
linear programming problems. If the players change the index, the 
solution of the game has to be recalculated. 
(iii) When α =1, the fuzzy game (4) corresponding to (10) reduces to the 
following crisp matrix game  
 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
=
18090
156180MA
  (15) 
 the entries of which are the main values of the fuzzy entries of the 
game (10). The solution of the game (15) is 02105) (0.7894,   =x ,
  0.7894) (0.2105,   =y the value of the game is v =161.05. Replacing
α  by 1 in (13)-(14), we get the same solution. Indeed, we obtain 
 )0.2105 ,7894.0()1( =x ( ) 4/19 , 15/19  = ,   , 0.7894) (0.2105, )1( =y and 
)1()1( wv = =161.05 (see Tables 3 and 4). Moreover, it is clear that 
when 1→α , the solution (13)-(14) of the fuzzy game (10) tends to 
the solution of the crisp matrix game (15). Our solution is exactly the 
same as the one obtained in Vijay et al. (2007), for α =1. 
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Table 3. 
α 
 1 x (α ) 2 x (α ) v(α ) 
1/3 0.77247 0.22753 160.81 
1/2 0.7766 0.2234 160.86 
2/3 0.7808 0.2192 160.92 
1 0.7894 0.2105 161.05 
Table 4. 
α  
1 y (α ) 2 y (α ) w(α ) 
1/3 0.22753 0.77247 160.81 
1/2 0.2234 0.7766 160.86 
2/3 0.2192 0.7808 160.92 
1 0.2105 0.7894 161.05 
 
(iv) The game (10) has been also treated using the Li’s multiobjective 
approach Li (1999). The following results have been obtained for 
Player I, ( )  19/4, 15/19  =x  and *~v =( ∗∗∗ UL vvv ,, )=(155.0025, 161.05, 
164.736); 
 for Player II, ( )    19/15, 19/4  =y  and *~w =( ∗∗∗ UL www ,, )=(155.264, 
161.05, 171.052). 
 
It is interesting to notice that the optimal strategies ( )  19/4, 15/19  =x , 
( )    19/15, 19/4  =y and the main value ** wv = =161.05 are exactly the same 
as for the crisp matrix game (15), the entries of which are the main values of 
the entries of the fuzzy matrix game (10), respectively. Further, by solving the 
crisp matrix game  
 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
=
17580
150175LA
  (16) 
the entries of which are the lower bounds of the fuzzy entries of the game (10), 
we get the value of the game Lv = 155.208, which is between 
∗
Lv =155.0025 
and ∗Lw =155.264. Next, by solving the crisp matrix game  
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⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
=
190100
158190UA
  (17) 
the entries of which are the upper bounds of the fuzzy entries of the game (10), 
we get the value of the game Uv =166.393, which is between 
∗
Uv =164.736 and 
∗
Uw =171.052. It would be interesting to find out whether this relation between 
the proposed solution in Li (1999) and Li & Yang (2004) and the solutions of 
the crisp matrix games (15)-(17) is true, in general, for matrix games of type 
(10) (fuzzy matrix games with TFN payoffs), in which case, it makes sense to 
propose the solution consisting of the optimal strategies of the crisp matrix 
game corresponding to (15) and the fuzzy value ),,(~ UL vvvv = , where v , 
Lv and Uv  are the values of the crisp matrix games corresponding to (15)-(17) 
respectively, as a solution to the considered game. The advantage of this 
solution over the Li’s would be its computational simplicity, since it reduces to 
the resolution of three independent crisp matrix games. 
The following example is taken from Maeda (2003). 
 
Example 3.3. (Computation of α -NL solution) Consider the fuzzy game 
defined by the fuzzy payoff matrix  
 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
=
08~10~9
65~108~1~A
  (18) 
It is assumed that the entries of A~  are the following STFNs, )5,180(08~1 =
, )6,156(65~1 = , )10,90(0~9 = . Let us compute an α -NL solution of this game 
by Procedure 3.1, assuming p = 1/2. 
 
Step1. Ask the players to provide α -cut levels. Assume that they have 
chosen 1α and 2α  respectively. Let α =Max{ 1α , 2α } in order to satisfy the 
choice of both players.  
First we solve the problem in general, then, at the end, we will assume 
concrete values for 1α and 2α .  
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α]~[ ija
 = { ija / αμ   )(~ ≥ija aij } = [
αα U
ij
L
ij aa , ], 2,1  =i , 2,1  =j , then 
using Remark 3.2, we obtain [ ] [ ]ααα  5 175 , 5185  180 −−= ,
[ ] [ ]ααα  6 162 , 6 150  156 −+=
, and [ ] [ ]ααα  10 100 , 10 80  90 −+= . 
Further, we have 2/122 ××=mnp =2, then 
   2   and   / )(    
,
ij2/1 ⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
=∈== ∑
ji
ij TT ββββ . 
Compute the matrix njmi
L
ij
L
ij
U
ijij aaaA ≤≤≤≤+−= 1 ,1)  )  ( (  αααβ β , 
2/1T∈β . Since the payoffs are STFNs, according to Remark 3.2 
 
=+−= ≤≤≤≤ njmi
L
ij
L
ij
U
ijij aaaA 1 ,1)  )  ( (  αααβ β
  
 
( ) njmiLijijij ahA ≤≤≤≤+−= 1 ,1)   2  2 (  αβ βα
=  
  
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
++−++−
++−++−
) 5 175(  5)2  2() 10 80(  10)2  2(
) 6 150(  6)2  2() 5 175(  5)2  2(
2221
1211
αβααβα
αβααβα
  
Step 2. Construct and solve the pair of optimization problems 
corresponding to problems (8)-(9). We have  
vMax 
 
 
vxx   )) 10 80(  10)2  2((  )) 5 175(  5)22(( 212111 ≥++−+++− αβααβα
  
 
vxx   )) 5 175(  5)2 2((   )) 6 150(  6)2 2(( 222121 ≥++−+++− αβααβα
  
2,1    ,0   ,121 =≥=+ ixxx i
, 
2/1T∈β
.  
wMin  
 
 
wyy   )) 6 150(  6)2  2((  )) 5 175(  5)2  2(( 212111 ≤++−+++− αβααβα
  
 
wyy   ))5  175(  5)2  2((  ))10  80(  10)2  2(( 222121 ≤++−+++− αβααβα
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Table 5. 
α 
 1 x (α ) 2 x (α ) 11 β  12 β  21 β  22 β  v(α ) 
1/3 0.7638 0.2362 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 159.30 
1/2 0.7978 0.2022 0.9999 0.9999 0.0000 0.0000 162.52 
2/3 0.7725 0.2275 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 162.62 
1 0.7895 0.2105     161.05 
Table 6. 
α 
 1 y (α ) 2 y (α ) 11 β  12 β  21 β  22 β  w(α ) 
1/3 0.2234 0.7786 1.0000 0.0000 0.9999 0.0000 159.08 
1/2 0.2185 0.7815 0.9999 0.0000 1.0000 0.0009 159.52 
2/3 0.2159 0.7841 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 159.99 
1 0.2105 0.7895     161.05 
 
2,1  ,0   ,121 =≥=+ jyyy j
, 2/1T∈β .   
By Nimbus software Miettinen & Mäkelä (2006), we obtain the following 
solutions for different values of α
 
Note that in Tables 5 and 6, for all values of 1≠α , we have ∑ ijβ =2. 
Here also in both tables we do not provide ijβ values for α =1, because the 
game (4) corresponding to (18) reduces to a crisp matrix game. 
 
Remark 3.4. Assuming, for instance, that the players have concretely 
chosen the cut-levels 1α =1/2, 2α =2/3, respectively. Let α =Max 
{1/2,2/3}=2/3. The corresponding α -NL solution to the considered game 
with the cut-level 2/3 is  
 
)2275.0,7725.0()3/2( =x
,
)7841.0 ,2159.0()3/2( =y
,  
 
62.162)3/2( =v
 and 99.159)3/2( =w .  
Maeda (2003) has obtained the following optimal strategies for the game (18) 
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),(* 21 ∗∗= xxx = (
μ
μ
μ
μ
12108
223
,
12108
1085
+
+
+
+ ), ),(* 21
∗∗
= yyy
= (
λ
λ
λ
λ
12108
1085
,
12108
223
+
+
+
+ ), (19) ]1,0[, ∈λμ , as Nash equilibrium of the bimatrix 
game  
 BG( λμ , )=( )(),(,,
22 μλ AASS − )  
where  
 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−−
−−
= λλ
λλλ
108520100
1216210185)(A
,  
and 
 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−−
−−
=
μμ
μμμ
108520100
1216210185)(A
   
For μλ = , the game BG( λμ , ) reduces to the crisp matrix (zero-sum) 
game 
 G( λ )=( ))(,, 22 λASS ),  
Maeda (2003) has also showed that his results are the same as in Compos 
(1989), when μλ = . However, the approach of Campos cannot be used for
μλ ≠  as Maeda pointed out. For the particular case μλ = =1/2, the crisp 
matrix game G( λ ), becomes G( 2/1 )=( ))2/1(,, 22 ASS ), where  
 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
==
18090
156180)2/1( MAA
  (20) 
that is, we obtain the matrix the entries of which are the main values of the 
entries of the fuzzy matrix game (18). On the other hand, when 1=α , the 
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game (4) corresponding to (18) reduces to the matrix game (20) as well, hence 
our solution coincides with Maeda’s solution when 1=α  in our model and 
μλ = =1/2 in Maeda’s model. Indeed, when 1=α , our solution of the game 
(18) is given by Tables 5 and 6 )2105.0,7895.0()1( =x ,
)7895.0 ,2105.0()1( =y , and 05.161)1()1( == wv . Putting μλ = =1/2 
in (19), we get the same solution. Note that Maeda did not give any game or 
fuzzy interpretation of the parameters μλ ,  involved in his model. 
 
Remark 3.5. Our approach for solving fuzzy matrix games is different 
from the existing approaches (Bector et al., 2004a; Bector et al., 2004b; Bector 
& Chandra, 2005; Campos, 1989; Li, 1999; Li & Yang, 2004; Maeda, 2003; 
Nishizaki and Sakawa, 1995, 1997, 2001; Vijay et al., 2005a, 2005b; Vijay et 
al., 2007). From a theoretical point of view, we introduce Nature as a third 
player that represents the uncertainty involved in the game and use the 
Laplace’s principle of insufficient reason to describe the players’ beliefs about 
the behavior of Nature towards them. Nature has no payoff, its strategies vary 
in the α -cuts of the fuzzy payoffs. We have used the α -cuts to defuzzify the 
game, and the pair of optimization problems (8)-(9) we obtain is different from 
that obtained in existing approaches, it contains the additional variable β and 
its constraints are not linear. Compared to the Maeda (2003) and Li (1999) 
approaches, our approach is more general in the sense that in Maeda (2003) 
and Li (1999) it is assumed that the payoffs are TFNs (STFNs for the case of 
Maeda (2003)), while in our approach the payoffs are assumed to be fuzzy 
intervals with bounded support as defined by Dubois and Prade. Our method 
differs from that of Campos (1989) and Bector et al. (2004a) in the sense that 
we do not use any ranking (index) function to defuzzify the game. Moreover, 
the solution we propose is flexible in the sense that it is related to the cut-level 
α =max{ 21 ,αα }, where 21 ,αα  are determined by Player I and Player II 
respectively, while in Campos (1989), Bector et al. (2004a) and Vijay et al 
(2005b) the solution depends essentially on the Yager’s index function chosen. 
In Nishizaki & Sakawa (1995) a fuzzy goal is defined for the Player I and a 
new crisp payoff, based on the membership functions of the fuzzy expected 
payoff and the fuzzy goal, is introduced for this player as a degree of 
attainment of his fuzzy goal. Our approach differs from the latter approach in 
the sense that we do not use fuzzy goals and the fuzzy expected payoff of 
Player I to define our solution. Moreover, from computational point of view, 
our approach reduces to the resolution of a pair of independent crisp nonlinear 
A Laplace’s Principle Based Approach for Solving Fuzzy Matrix Games 25 
programming problems with linear objective function and quite simple 
nonlinear constraints (quadratic but not involving squared variables), while in 
Nishizaki & Sakawa (1995) the computation of the solution requires the 
resolution of a nonlinear programming problem. Finally, compared to Vijay et 
al. (2007), in our approach we do not use any fuzzy ordering or relation to 
express the preferences of players over the fuzzy payoffs or fuzzy expected 
payoffs. Moreover, the initial fuzzy matrix game is transformed into a special 
crisp three person game. 
4. CONCLUSION 
In this paper we have presented a new approach for solving matrix two-
person zero-sum games with fuzzy payoffs. Our approach differs from the 
existing ones in the sense that it does not use any ranking of fuzzy numbers, 
the payoffs are assumed to be fuzzy intervals with bounded support as defined 
by Dubois and Prade, and it introduces Nature as a third player that expresses 
the uncertainty involved in the game. The Laplace’s principle of insufficient 
reason is used to represent the beliefs of player about the behavior of Nature 
towards them. In addition, we provided a quite simple procedure for the 
computation of the α -NL solution of the game that reduces to solving a pair 
of independent crisp nonlinear programming problems. Finally, we think that 
extending this new approach for solving other types of non cooperative games 
with fuzzy payoffs and/or fuzzy goals may be a worthy direction of research. 
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